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LEAVING THE INVISIBLE UNIVERSE:
WHY ALL VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION NEED A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Peter Johnston*
INTRODUCTION
It begins with the “twenty minute takeout,” as that is all it
takes for the victim to be “transformed into a state of almost total
immobility and sensory deprivation.”1 The victim, usually in a
small room, is quickly blindfolded by four to six Central
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) agents who are “dressed in black like
ninjas” with their faces concealed.2 The agents, elite and highly
trained, operate pursuant to an established modus operandi and
they do not speak to each other.3 The victim is brutally punched,
shoved, or firmly gripped, and then his hands and feet are
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.S.B.A., The University of North
Carolina, 2004. The author wishes to thank Professor Wendy Seltzer and the
members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their advice and assistance. He
also appreciates the work of investigative reporters who help inform their readers
about extraordinary rendition.
1
COUNCIL OF EUR., PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON LEGAL
AFFAIRS AND H UMAN RIGHTS, ALLEGED SECRET DETENTIONS AND UNLAWFUL
INTER-STATE TRANSFERS OF DETAINEES INVOLVING COUNCIL OF EUROPE
MEMBER STATES 22–23 (June 12, 2006), available at http://assembly.coe.
int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060606_Ejdoc162006PartII-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT].
2
Id. at 23; see also Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a
CIA Mistake; German Citizen Released After Months in ‘Rendition,’ W ASH.
POST , Dec. 4, 2005, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment].
3
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 22–23.
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shackled.4 All of the victim’s clothes are then methodically cut
from his body and he is subject to a full body cavity search.5 Next,
the victim is photographed totally or nearly naked, and a foreign
object, perhaps a tranquilizer, is forcibly inserted into his anus. 6
Then, the victim is dressed in a diaper, has his ears muffled, and a
cloth bag, without holes for breathing or detecting light, is placed
over his head.7 He is forced into an airplane, where he is placed on
a stretcher, shackled, strapped to a seat or mattress, or “laid down
on the floor of the plane [bound] up in a very uncomfortable
position that makes him hurt from moving.”8 The flight can take up
to an entire day, and the destination is either a detention facility
operated by a cooperative nation in Central Asia or the Middle
East, or one of the CIA’s own covert prisons, called “black sites.”9
If the victim is sent to a black site, he is taken to his cell and his
clothes are cut up and torn off.10 He may be kept naked for several
weeks, and all he is given is a bowl, a bucket to urinate into, and a
blanket that is too small.11 The weather in the cell is controlled to
produce temperature extremes: sometimes “freezing cold,”
sometimes “so hot one would gasp for breath.”12 The victim never
experiences natural light or natural darkness, and he is frequently
blindfolded.13 He will likely experience the “four month isolation
4

Id. at 23.
Id.; see also Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
6
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 23–24; see
also Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
7
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 24; see also
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
8
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
9
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
10
COUNCIL OF EUROPE., PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON LEGAL
AFFAIRS AND HUMAN R IGHTS, SECRET DETENTIONS AND ILLEGAL TRANSFERS
OF DETAINEES INVOLVING COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES: SECOND
REPORT 51 (June 7, 2007), available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/
2007/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE
2007 REPORT]. For more details of the conditions of a typical CIA detention
cell, see id. at 51–53.
11
Id. at 51–52.
12
Id. at 52.
13
Id.
5
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regime:” for more than 120 days, he is granted absolutely no
contact with human beings other than masked, silent guards. 14
Additionally, his cell is subject to constant surveillance by cameras,
microphones, and guards.15
There is likely a shackling ring in the wall of the cell, and the
victim’s body will be shackled and forced into contorted shapes for
“long, painful periods.”16 The victim will be unable to sleep due to
relentless noises and disturbances, such as engine noise, loud rock
and rap music, cackling laughter, and the screams of women and
children.17 Other torture techniques he may experience include “the
cold cell,” where the victim is forced to stand naked in a cell kept at
about fifty degrees and is continuously doused with cold water,
and being forced to stand upright with his wrists and ankles
shackled for more than forty hours.18
The victim may also be waterboarded, a technique the United
States considered a war crime in the tribunals after Japan’s defeat
in World War II.19 Waterboarding is a form of “slow motion
drowning” which involves placing cloth over the victim’s face and
then pouring water on the cloth, causing the victim to choke or
become unconscious because his throat is slowly being filled with
water.20 Often the prisoner is strapped onto a board during the

14

Id.
Id.
16
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 53.
17
Id.
18
Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques
Described, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/
WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866.
19
Walter Pincus, Waterboarding Historically Controversial, W ASH.
POST , Oct. 5, 2006, at A17; Eric Weiner, Waterboarding: A Tortured History,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO , Nov. 7, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=15886834. In 1947, the United States
charged Yukio Asano, a Japanese officer, with war crimes because he allegedly
waterboarded an American civilian. He was convicted and sentenced to fifteen
years of hard labor. Id.
20
Weiner, supra note 19. Another less common form of waterboarding
involves pumping water directly into the stomach of the victim, creating intense
pain and a feeling like the victim’s “organs are on fire.” Id.
15
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process.21 The victim’s gag reflex inevitably kicks in and he
experiences a “terrifying fear of drowning.”22 Waterboarding is an
attractive technique to some because it causes great physical and
mental suffering without leaving any marks on the victim.23
The process described above is not a horror movie, conspiracy
theory, or set of allegations. It is a real practice created and
executed by the United States of America.24 It is called
“extraordinary rendition,” and it has happened to hundreds of
people.25
For purposes of this Note, extraordinary rendition is defined as
“the transfer of an individual, with the involvement of the United
States or its agents, to a foreign state where there are substantial
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”26 Extraordinary rendition includes situations
in which the victim is transferred to a foreign state but is still in the
custody of United States agents. It is one type of extra-legal
transfer employed by the United States in the so-called “War on
Terror.”27 By contrast, “regular” rendition is a process in which an

21

See id.; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18.
Ross & Esposito, supra note 18.
23
Weiner, supra note 19.
24
CIA Chief Backs Rendition Flights, BBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2007,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7070483.stm [hereinafter CIA
Chief Backs Rendition Flights]; COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra
note 10, at 3.
25
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
26
The “substantial grounds” standard is the same standard employed in the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in
which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be
in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person
is physically present in the United States.
Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, Title XXII, § 2242.
27
See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary
Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. W ASH . L. R EV. 1333, 1336–37
(2007). Other types of extra-legal transfers include the repatriation of detainees
held at Guantanamo Bay or the transfer of detainees captured in battlefields in
Iraq or Afghanistan. Id.
22
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individual is transferred from one nation to another without the
benefit of legal procedures like extradition, removal, or exclusion
and without allegations of involvement in torture.28 However, the
distinction between rendition and extraordinary rendition is
“increasingly being blurred” and U.S. officials and media reports
frequently fail to distinguish between them.29
Although victims of extraordinary rendition currently have
several possible causes of action to redress their wrongful capture,
torture, and suffering, each cause is subject to serious, often fatal,
limitations. For example, the United States has successfully
invoked the state secrets defense30 and the separation of powers
and political question doctrines31 in response to lawsuits from
victims of extraordinary rendition. The extent of civil liability for
American officials who participate in extraordinary renditions is
unclear, leaving the Executive Branch free to operate without
checks and balances and deprive individuals of their due process
rights. This Note argues that a law specifically allowing victims of
extraordinary rendition to sue the United States will compensate
victims while also discouraging the Executive Branch from acting
outside the purview of Congress and the Judiciary. The national
security and due process issues surrounding the practice of
extraordinary rendition are best addressed by three branches of
government, not one.32 Such a law will allow the Executive Branch
28

ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE C ITY OF NEW YORK & CENTER FOR
HUMAN R IGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, T ORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL
AND D OMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY R ENDITIONS” 5 (New
York: ABCNY & NYU School of Law, 2004), available at http://www.chrgj.
org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf [hereinafter T ORTURE BY PROXY].
29
Id. at 13.
30
See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied El-Masri v.
United States, 128 S.Ct. 373, 2007 WL 1646914, *1 (2007) (dismissing ElMasri’s lawsuit because the government invoked the state secrets defense). For a
detailed explanation of this defense, see infra Part II.A.
31
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing
Arar’s extraordinary rendition claims on separation of powers and political
question doctrine grounds). For explanation of these two doctrines, see infra
notes 188–190, 197–205 and accompanying text.
32
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’ Connor, J.,
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to enforce the law and protect the United States while empowering
the Judicial Branch to ensure that the Executive adheres to the
constitutional requirements of due process.
High-ranking members of the Executive Branch, such as
President Bush and CIA Director Michael Hayden, claim that the
extraordinary rendition program is justified because it produces
valuable intelligence for the fight against terrorism.33 However,
other members of the Executive Branch and some scholars maintain
that the program actually harms the fight against terrorism.34 They
argue that the components of extraordinary rendition, such as
secret arbitrary detention and torture, erode the moral high ground
that the United States must maintain to defeat terrorism, thereby
facilitating the recruitment of new terrorists.35 Furthermore,
extraordinary rendition is not necessary because less coercive
interrogation methods are equally or more effective at eliciting
information.36 Finally, the premise of the government’s argument—
that the individual rights of freedom from arbitrary detention and
torture should be subjugated to claimed national security
interests—is false. The means of extraordinary rendition turn the
United States into the very type of place the government is
supposed to protect its people against.
Part I of this Note explains the development and mechanics of
extraordinary rendition and the extent to which the U.S.
government admits to the practice. It demonstrates why the core
human rights of freedom against arbitrary detention and torture,
both of which are violated by extraordinary rendition, should not
be subjected to a balancing test just because the Executive Branch
asserts that these rights need to be sacrificed in the name of
national security. Part I also shows why extraordinary rendition is
plurality) (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in
times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake.”).
33
See infra note 88 and accompanying text; CIA Chief Backs Rendition
Flights, supra note 24.
34
Infra Part I.E.
35
Id.
36
Infra Part I.D.
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not necessary to protect the United States, how, in some ways, it
actually damages the security of the nation, and that it promotes
disrespect for human rights around the world. Part I concludes by
detailing the plight of two innocent men, Khaled El-Masri and
Maher Arar, wrongfully subjected to extraordinary rendition. Part
II describes the three main existing causes of action for victims of
extraordinary rendition and the problems litigants face in pursuing
these theories of liability. Part III explains the proposed law and its
essential elements, arguing that Congress should create a specific
cause of action for victims of extraordinary rendition. This cause of
action will alleviate concerns that the Judiciary is violating the
political question doctrine and the separation of powers doctrine
because Congress will specifically authorize the lawsuit. Such a
legal remedy will also allow the Executive to preserve state secrets
but still allow victims of extraordinary rendition to recover
damages. Finally, the law will address practical problems that
victims of extraordinary rendition face in suing the United States,
such as the difficulty of corroborating their claims with evidence.
I.

EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION EXPLAINED
A. Evolution and Mechanics of Extraordinary Rendition

The CIA created the extraordinary rendition program in 1995 in
response to fears that Osama bin Laden was acquiring weapons of
mass destruction.37 Though the Agency had located many
suspected terrorists, it was reluctant to bring them into the United
States.38 If prosecuted in the United States, suspects must be
granted due process,39 and the CIA would have to reveal secrets
about its intelligence methods and sources.40 The fear that foreign
37

COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s
‘Extraordinary Rendition’ Program, T HE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005,
at 109.
39
Id.
40
Id. For example, normally mundane tasks like establishing the chain of
custody of a computer become complicated when foreign governments are
38
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governments would be uncooperative if called to testify in court,
coupled with CIA views that other branches of the government
interfered,41 led the CIA to send suspects to Egypt, a nation
frequently cited by the State Department for torturing its
prisoners.42 Many of these suspects, some of them allegedly senior
al Qaeda members, were Egyptian, and the Americans wanted them
arrested while the Egyptians wanted custody over them so they
could be interrogated.43 These complimentary interests led the
American and Egyptian intelligence agencies to develop a close
partnership whereby the Americans “could give the Egyptian
interrogators questions they wanted to put to the detainees in the
morning . . . and get answers by the evening.”44
While questionable, these early extraordinary renditions still
had more safeguards than the programs used today: every rendered
individual was convicted in absentia, and all renditions were
approved by CIA legal counsel on the basis of a substantive
dossier.45 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, however, the
extraordinary rendition program changed drastically: “there was a
‘before 9/11’ and there was an ‘after 9/11.’ After 9/11, the gloves
came off.”46 For example, “[w]hat began as a program aimed at a
small, discrete set of suspects—people against whom there were
outstanding foreign arrest warrants—came to include a wide and illdefined population.”47 The initial safeguards were eliminated due to
involved, as these governments may not want to admit their secret cooperation
in open court. Id.
41
For example, one time the State Department would not let the CIA and
FBI question one of Osama bin Laden’s cousins in the United States because he
had a diplomatic passport protecting him from law enforcement. Id.
42
Id. For example, see U.S. D EPT. OF STATE , EGYPT, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN R IGHTS PRACTICES (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl
/rls/hrrpt/2006/78851.htm.
43
Mayer, supra note 38, at 109.
44
Id. at 110.
45
Id. This statement is according to Michael Scheuer, a former CIA
counter-terrorism expert involved in establishing the practice of extraordinary
rendition.
46
Id. at 112. This quote is from Cofer Black, then-in-charge of counterterrorism at the CIA, to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.
47
Id. at 107.
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the intense pressure on the CIA after September 11 to prevent
another potential attack.48 Today, many people subject to
extraordinary rendition have not been charged with a crime.49 The
focus of these renditions has changed as well: rather than further a
criminal investigation or trial, rendition is increasingly used for the
purpose of interrogation and is often employed in circumstances
indicating a foreseeable possibility of torture,50 Because the CIA
does not normally comment publicly about the process, the exact
number of renditions, extraordinary or regular, is unknown. 51
Post-September 11 pressure bore especially hard on the
Counterterrorist Center (“CTC”), an office of the CIA referred to
by a counterterrorism official as “the Camelot of
counterterrorism.”52 After September 11, 2001, the CTC received
thousands of pieces of information about potential threats, and the
staff was increased from 300 to almost 1,200 “nearly overnight.”53
Former and current intelligence officials have said that the shock of
the attack, coupled with a frenzied, heightened responsibility led
the “process of vetting and evaluating information [to] suffer[]
greatly.”54 As admitted by a former senior intelligence official,
“Whatever quality control mechanisms were in play on September
10th were eliminated on September 11th.”55
Not only is the process of culling new information unchecked
and admittedly pressurized, but the CTC is also criticized by
others in the CIA for its operations techniques in rendering
individuals.56 Instead of using agents to penetrate terrorist
networks, as it did in the past, the CTC presently employs a
“Hollywood” model of capturing and detaining suspects, relying on
48

Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Danielle Knight, Outsourcing A Real Nasty Job: Shipping Terrorism
Suspects Overseas for Some Tough Questioning May Make Sense. But Is It
Legal? U.S. N EWS AND W ORLD REPORT, May 23, 2005, at 34.
52
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
49
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flashy paramilitary efforts.57
Further adding to the Hollywood quality of its operations,
some detainees are flown by private jets owned by a series of
dummy American corporations.58 These jets are operated by real
companies controlled by or connected to the CIA, can often fly to
locations where American military aircraft cannot, and have
permits to land at American military bases worldwide.59 Also,
these planes sometimes allow the CIA to avoid reporting
requirements imposed by foreign governments on flights operated
by other foreign governments. 60 The CIA does not own or operate
its own planes because it wants to act in secret.61 However, the
CIA’s cover was blown by plane-spotting hobbyists with
powerful binoculars and cameras, activists, investigative
journalists, and investigations by foreign nations such as Italy and
Sweden and multi-national investigative bodies such as the
57

Id. See supra notes 1–9 for a description of this process, known as the
“twenty minute takedown.”
58
Scott Shane, Stephen Grey & Margot Williams, CIA Expanding Terror
Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights, N.Y. T IMES, May 31, 2005, at A1;
Dana Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret In Terror War, W ASH. POST , Dec. 27,
2004, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret]. For all practical
purposes, the CIA owns these planes, but puts them under the name of shell
corporations with unremarkable names to keep their operations secret. See id.
These corporations seemingly have no premise other than owning these planes,
and the officers and directors of these companies “seem to be invented.” Id. One
such shell company is Premier Executive Transport Services: its directors and
officers “appear to exist only on paper.” Id. This company owns a Gulfstream V
jet, tail number N379P, that has clearance to land at American military bases
worldwide and has landed at known U.S. government refueling locations. Id.
59
Shane, Grey & Williams, supra note 58. These operating companies
owned by or with ties to the CIA include Aero Contractors, Pegasus
Technologies, and Tepper Aviation. Id. Aero Contractors was founded in 1979
by a famous CIA officer and chief pilot for Air America, the CIA’s air company
during the Vietnam era. Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.; Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret, supra note 58. For more on the CIA’s
use of private aircraft to facilitate extraordinary rendition, see AMNESTY INT ’ L ,
BELOW THE RADAR: SECRET FLIGHTS TO T ORTURE AND ‘D ISAPPEARANCE’ 22–
24, 27–30 (Apr. 5, 2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
AMR510512006ENGLISH/$File/AMR5105106.pdf.
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 62 One reason
why these investigations yielded so much information is that these
people and groups often worked together and shared information.63
Furthermore, the American Civil Liberties Union has filed a lawsuit
against a company allegedly involved in extraordinary rendition
flights, Jeppesen Dataplan, a subsidiary of Boeing, alleging that the
company provided flight and logistical support services for more
than seventy extraordinary renditions during a four year period.64
However, not all detainees are flown by privately-owned
aircraft: some are flown by military planes, including large cargo
planes.65 When detainees finally arrive at the rendition location,
they often vanish into an “invisible universe.”66 Rendered suspects
are not provided a lawyer, and often their families are not informed
62

Priest, Jet Is An Open Secret, supra note 58; Shane, Grey & Williams,
supra note 58; COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 15–
21.
63
For example, the Parliamentary Assembly investigation pieced together
information gained from plane-spotters, investigative journalists, certain
websites, victims of extraordinary rendition, flight records and logs, and legal
proceedings in Europe and the United States. COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006
REPORT, supra note 1, at 17–18. For more detailed findings of this
investigation, see id. at 15–21.
64
Henry Weinstein, ACLU suit alleged firm is profiting from torture; The
Boeing subsidiary is accused of helping facilitate mistreatment of terrorism
suspects, L.A. T IMES, May 31, 2007, at B1. The suit accuses the company of
profiting from torture and providing flight and logistical support services to the
CIA, such as “itinerary, route, weather, and fuel planning, as well as customs
clearance assistance, ground transportation, food, hotels and security.” Id.
65
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
66
Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate is
Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set
Up After 9/11, W ASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, CIA
Holds Terror Suspects]. The “invisible” term refers to the fact that the locations
of these internment centers and basic information about how they operate is
withheld from the public and almost all members of Congress responsible for
oversight of the CIA’s covert actions. Indeed, “virtually nothing is known
about who is kept in the facilities, what interrogation methods are employed
with them, or how decisions are made about whether they should be detained or
for how long.” Id. The “universe” term refers to the fact that this internment
network is global and thus detainees could be in almost any part of the world.
See id.
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of their location.67
The extent of CIA participation in the interrogation of rendered
detainees varies from case to case.68 In some instances, U.S.
officials observe live interrogations through one-way mirrors.69 In
others, Americans feed questions to the interrogators,70 or question
the detainees directly. 71 Sometimes, the CIA employs a “false flag”
technique by using fake disguises and décor meant to trick a
detainee into thinking he is in a nation with a reputation for brutal
interrogation although he is actually still under CIA control.72 In
some cases, the CIA uses female interrogators to create a
“psychologically jarring experience,” as many detainees were raised
in conservative Muslim cultures where women are never in
control.73
Not only are suspected terrorists subjected to detention and
abuse, but their family members—including children—are
sometimes detained and subjected to coercive treatment as well.74
Some of these family members have been subsequently released
from custody, but others remain unaccounted for.75 Yusuf alKhalid, then nine years old, and Abed al-Khalid, then seven years
old, were taken into custody by Pakistani intelligence officers in
September 2002 when their apartment was raided.76 Their father is
67

Mayer, supra note 38, at 107.
Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
Interrogations; ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects eld in
Secret Overseas Facilities, W ASH. P OST , Dec. 26, 2002, at A01.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects; Europe
Aware of Operations, She Implies, W ASH . POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at A01.
72
Priest & Gellman, supra note 68.
73
Id.
74
AMNESTY INT’ L ET AL ., OFF THE RECORD: U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ENFORCED D ISAPPEARANCES IN THE “W AR ON T ERROR” 24–26 (2007),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR510932007ENGLISH/
$File/AMR5109307.pdf [hereinafter OFF THE RECORD].
75
Id. at 24.
76
Id.; Olga Craig, CIA holds young sons of captured al-Qa’eda chief,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 9, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co
.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2003%2F03%2F09%2Fwalqa09.xml.
68
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Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, accused of being the mastermind of the
September 11 attacks, who is presently being held at Guantanamo
Bay. 77 In March 2003, Yusuf and Abed were transferred into CIA
custody at a “secret address” in the United States so the CIA could
question them and use them to get their father “to talk.”78
B. Extent to Which the Government Admits to Practicing
Extraordinary Rendition
On the record, the United States government admits to the
practice of “regular” rendition, but states that it is not U.S. policy
to send detainees “to countries where [it believes or it knows] that
they’re going to be tortured.”79 In reality, however, this “policy”
against international torture is rather flimsy. Former-U.S. Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales has claimed that if a detainee were
transferred to a country with a history of torture, the United States
will seek “additional assurances” that the transferred detainee will
not be tortured.80 He nonetheless recognized, however, that the
Bush Administration “can’t fully control” what other nations do,
and did not know if nations had complied with any promises not to
torture detainees.81
Off the record, however, government officials admit to
practicing extraordinary rendition involving as much torture as
necessary. 82 This practice is illustrated by a December 2002
interview by The Washington Post with ten current national
security officials and several former intelligence officials about
detention and interrogation of captives.83 “The picture that emerges
is of a brass-knuckled quest for information, often in concert with
77

Id.
OFF THE RECORD, supra note 74, at 25; Craig, supra note 76. The fate of
these children is unknown to the author of this Note.
79
R. Jeffrey Smith, Gonzales Defends Transfer of Detainees, W ASH.
POST , Mar. 8, 2005, at A03.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Priest & Gellman, supra note 68; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18;
Pincus, supra note 19.
83
Priest & Gellman, supra note 68.
78
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allies of dubious human rights reputation, in which the traditional
lines between right and wrong, legal and inhumane, are evolving and
blurred.”84 One of the officials interviewed, who supervised the
capture and transfer of accused terrorists, told the paper, “If you
don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you
probably aren’t doing your job.”85 Another official directly
involved in rendering captives said, “We don’t kick the shit out of
them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the shit
out of them.”86 Similarly, a third official, also directly involved in
rendition, told The Washington Post that he knew detainees were
likely to be tortured, and that he “do[es] it with [his] eyes open.”87
C. The Core Human Rights of Freedom Against Arbitrary
Detention and Torture Should Not be Subverted in the
Claimed Interest of National Security
President Bush has stated that a “small number of suspected
terrorist leaders and operatives” have been “held and questioned
outside the United States in a separate program operated by the
Central Intelligence Agency,” and that this program is “crucial to
getting life-saving information” that will prevent future attacks. 88
Similarly, CIA Director Hayden has stated that the sole reason the
United States has the rendition program is that it produces
“irreplaceable intelligence.”89 Additionally, President Bush has
stated that “Today’s war on terror is, above all, a struggle for
freedom and liberty . . . . We’re fighting for our way of life and our
ability to live in freedom. We’re fighting for the cause of humanity
against those who seek to impose the darkness of tyranny and
terror upon the entire world.”90
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. His eyes are open to the fact that detainees will probably be tortured
after they are rendered. Id.
88
Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1568,
1570–74 (Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Remarks on the War on Terror].
89
CIA Chief Backs Rendition Flights, supra note 24.
90
Remarks on the War on Terror, supra note 88, at 1575.
85
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It is hypocritical, in the name of “a struggle for freedom and
liberty,” to in fact deny those same freedoms and liberties to
victims of extraordinary rendition.91 Extraordinary rendition defeats
the very freedoms it is designed to protect by itself spreading the
“darkness of tyranny,” as arbitrary detention and torture are two
of the primary tools of tyrants.92 Indeed, in a recent Supreme
Court case in which the Executive Branch unilaterally detained an
individual on the grounds that he was an “enemy combatant” who
conspired with terrorists, four Justices cautioned that such
detention “ha[s] created a unique and unprecedented threat to the
freedom of every American citizen:”93
[A]t stake in this case is nothing less than the very essence
of a free society . . . . Unconstrained executive detention for
the purpose of investigating and preventing subversive
activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber . . . executive
detention of subversive citizens . . . may not . . . be justified
by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to
extract information. Incommunicado detention for months
on end is such a procedure . . . . For if this Nation is to
remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not

91

See infra note 137 and accompanying text describing how extraordinary
rendition is a hybrid human rights violation.
92
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 (Alexander Hamilton), available at
http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/federalist/federalist-80-85/federalist.84.shtml
(last visited Nov. 20, 2007) (“[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonment[] ha[s]
been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrument[] of tyranny.”); see
also United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1541 (10th Cir. 1989) (“We are
mindful of the oft-quoted words of Judge Learned Hand that ‘[s]ave for torture, it
would be hard to find a more effective tool of tyranny than the power of
unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination.’”).
93
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (5–4 decision) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In Padilla, Padilla was detained by the Department of Defense
because the President determined that he was an “enemy combatant” who
conspired with al Qaeda to execute terrorist attacks in the United States. Id. at
430. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention, but
the Court did not address the merits of Padilla’s claim because it ruled that as a
threshold matter, he filed the petition with the wrong district court. Id.
However, the dissent did address the merits and ruled that Padilla was entitled
to a habeas proceeding. Id. at 464.
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wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the
forces of tyranny.94
This passage warns against the dangers of extraordinary rendition
as well because many victims of extraordinary rendition are also
deemed enemy combatants, 95 and victims of extraordinary rendition
experience the same deprivation of liberty as enemy combatants:
namely, incommunicado detention at the unrestrained will of the
Executive Branch.96
D. Extraordinary Rendition is Not Necessary to Protect the
Security of the United States
From a practical perspective, the United States should not
practice extraordinary rendition because other, non-or less coercive
means of interrogation are equally or more effective at eliciting
information from suspects.97 Indeed, experts on interrogation state
that other interrogation methods—such as those employing
carefully planned psychological techniques—are equally or more
94

Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Mayer, supra note 38, at 107.
96
See infra note 137 and accompanying text describing how extraordinary
rendition is a hybrid human rights violation.
97
Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement
of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A1 (“Many veteran
interrogators, psychologists, and other experts say that less coercive methods are
equally or more effective” than “slaps to the head[,] long hours held naked in a
frigid cell[,] days and nights without sleep while battered by thundering rock
music[,] long periods manacled in stress positions[,] or the ultimate,
waterboarding.”); see also Ross & Esposito, supra note 18 (“Two experienced
officers have told ABC that there is little to be gained by these [coercive CIA
techniques] that could not be more effectively gained by a methodical, careful,
psychologically based interrogation.”); see also Larry Johnson, Editorial, Why
Torture Should Never be an Option, L.A. T IMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at 11. Mr.
Johnson is a former CIA officer who was the deputy director of the State
Department Office of Counterterrorism from 1989 to 1993. Id. Additionally,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Stimson told The Washington
Post that interrogators “tell you that the intelligence they get from detainees is
best derived through a period of rapport-building, long-term.” R. Jeffrey Smith
& Michael Fletcher, Bush Says Detainees Will be Tried; He Confirms Existence
of CIA Prisons, W ASH . POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1.
95
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effective at eliciting information.98 “What real CIA field officers
know firsthand is that it is better to build a relationship of trust—
even with a terrorist, even if it’s time consuming—than to extract
quick confessions through tactics such as those used by the Nazis
and the Soviets, who believed that national security always
trumped human rights.”99 More generally, the idea that the United
States needs to subjugate the rights of some people for the alleged
security of all people has been emphatically rejected by history. 100
98

Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 97; Ross & Esposito, supra note
18; Johnson, supra note 97; Smith & Fletcher, supra note 97.
99
Johnson, supra note 97.
100
GEOFFREY STONE , PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN W ARTIME 12–13
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2004), identifies six crisis periods in American history
when the government has significantly restricted civil liberties. These periods
are: (a) the end of the Eighteenth Century, when the Sedition Act of 1798 was
enacted, (b) the Civil War, (c) World War I, (d) World War II, (e) the Cold
War, and (f) the Vietnam War. Professor Stone argues that the United States
probably could have survived each of these crises without those infringements on
civil liberties and that these infringements are regarded as mistakes. Id. at 528–
29.
The Sedition Act of 1798 has been condemned in the “court of
history,” Lincoln’s suspensions of habeas corpus were declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan, the
Court’s own decisions upholding the World War I prosecutions of
dissenters were all later effectively overruled, and the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II has been the subject of
repeated government apologies and reparations. Likewise, the Court’s
decision in Dennis upholding the convictions of the leaders of the
Communist Party has been discredited, the loyalty programs and
legislative investigations of that era have all been condemned, and the
efforts of the U.S. government to “expose, disrupt and otherwise
neutralize” antiwar activities during the Vietnam War have been
denounced by Congress and the Department of Justice.
Id. at 529. He continues arguing that history has proven that in the face of
danger, American citizens are willing to disadvantage “others,” such as Japanese
Americans, Communists, and hippies, in the false belief that doing so will
secure the safety of Americans. Id. at 529. Today, the “others” are suspected
terrorists. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 50.
The [Bush] Administration routinely speaks of “aliens,” “deadly
enemies” and “faceless terrorists,” with the clear intention of
dehumanizing its detainees in the eyes of the American population….

J OHNSTON F INAL DRAFT A UTHOR IZED . DOC

374

12/18/07 4:40 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Indeed, “[a]ll of history shows that arbitrary decisions, contempt
for human values and torture have never been effective, have failed
to resolve anything and, ultimately, have led only to a subsequent
exacerbation of violence and brutality.”101
Not only are other interrogation methods equally or more
effective at eliciting information, but most experts agree that
information gleaned from torture is unreliable.102 “You can get

By characterizing these people held in secret detention as ‘different’
from us—not as humans, but as ghosts, aliens, or terrorists—the US
Government tries to lead us into the trap of thinking they are not like
us, they are not subjects of the law, therefore their human rights do not
deserve protection.
Id.
101

COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 58.
See Mayer, supra note 38, at 116; see also Scott Shane & Mark
Mazzetti, Advisers Fault Harsh Methods In Interrogation, N.Y. T IMES, May
30, 2007, at A1 (Experts advising the Bush Administration on interrogation
rules state that harsh interrogation techniques used since the 2001 terrorist
attacks are “outmoded, amateurish, and unreliable.”); Ross & Esposito, supra
note 18 (Many experienced intelligence agency and military interrogators feel
that a confession induced by the CIA’s harsh interrogation techniques, such as
waterboarding, is unreliable.); COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF
CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS
RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 193 (Ottawa,
Public Works and Governments Services Canada, 2006), available at http://
www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf [hereinafter ARAR COMMISSION
ANALYSIS] (After hearing from expert witnesses, the commission concluded that
“[g]iving credence to statements obtained through torture can be dangerous, as
the reliability of such statements is at best uncertain.”). For more on the Arar
Commission, see infra note 158). Lt. Gen. John F. Kimmons, the Army
deputy chief of staff for intelligence, has stated that “no good intelligence is
going to come from abusive practices. I think the empirical evidence of the last
five years, hard years, tell us that.” Smith & Fletcher, supra note 97. Paul
Eaton, formerly Major General in the U.S. Army, stated that “the only thing
you are sure of with torture is that pain is involved—the information you get
may waste your time or worse.” Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial
Detention, and Treatment Of Detainees: Restoring our Moral Credibility and
Strengthening our Diplomatic Standing, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Paul Eaton, former Major
General in the US Army), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/
testimony/2007/EatonTestimony070726.pdf.
102
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anyone to confess to anything if the torture’s bad enough.”103 Even
Porter Goss, the former Director of the CIA, acknowledges that
“torture is counterproductive.”104 A large part of the problem is
that many detainees simply “have nothing to tell.”105
Compounding the problem of unreliability is the fact that false
information regarding terrorism is “especially dangerous,” as it can
have “grossly unfair” consequences, such as extraordinary
rendition, for innocent individuals like Maher Arar.106 Therefore,
any benefits flowing from information elicited by torture are offset
to a certain degree by the harms of such information, which could
include the torture of an innocent man.107
In fact, “one of the greatest intelligence failures in American
history” occurred in part because the Bush Administration believed
in the tortured confessions extracted by extraordinary rendition.108
103

Ross and Esposito, supra note 18. This statement is according to
former CIA officer Bob Baer.
104
William Branigin, CIA Director Defends Detention Policy, W ASH.
POST , Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/29/AR2005112900667.html.
105
Mayer, supra note 38, at 116.
106
ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 13–14, 59, 61–62.
Although the false intelligence regarding Maher Arar that led to his extraordinary
rendition was not extracted by torture, that he was extraordinarily rendered based
on false information demonstrates that false information, extracted by torture or
not, can cause innocent people to be tortured. See id. at 13–14 (reporting that
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police provided the United States with false
information about Maher Arar, and it is “very likely” that American authorities
relied on this information in extraordinarily rendering Arar). It is possible that
some past or future extraordinary renditions were/may be based on false
information gained by the torture of other past rendition victims.
107
See supra note 106.
108
Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial Detention, and Treatment of
Detainees: Restoring our Moral Credibility and Strengthening our Diplomatic
Standing, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch Washington
Advocacy Director), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/
2007/MalinowskiTestimony070726.pdf; Stephen Grey, CIA Rendition: The
Smoking Gun Cable, ABC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://blogs.
abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/11/cia-rendition-t.html; S. Rep. No. 109-331, at
79–82 (2006); Ross & Esposito, supra note 18.
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Ibn al Sheikh al Libi, a victim of extraordinary rendition to Egypt,
was tortured by both the CIA and Egyptian authorities.109 The
CIA waterboarded al Libi and subjected him to the “cold cell” by
forcing him to stand naked overnight in a cold cell and regularly
dousing him with cold water.110 Then, the CIA extraordinarily
rendered him to Egypt, where he was beaten and effectively buried
alive for about seventeen hours.111 To prevent further torture by
American and Egyptian hands, al Libi made a series of false claims
to his American and Egyptian captors.112 He claimed to be a
member of al-Qaeda and he provided false information “regarding
al-Qa’ida’s sending representatives to Iraq to try to obtain
[weapons of mass destruction] assistance.”113 In February 2003,
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell used these claims at the
United Nations to justify the war in Iraq.114 However, when talking
to CIA “debriefers” in 2004, al Libi recanted his claims and told the
CIA that he was tortured.115 The CIA believed that he was tortured
and retracted the intelligence he provided in a cable sent to CIA
headquarters in Langley, Virginia116 This example demonstrates
that not only is evidence regarding terrorism extracted by torture
sometimes false, but that it can have extremely dangerous
consequences affecting individuals around the world.

109

Malinowski, supra note 108; Grey, supra note 108; Ross & Esposito,
supra note 18.
110
Ross & Esposito, supra note 18; Malinowski, supra note 108.
111
Grey, supra note 108; S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82.
112
Malinowski, supra note 108; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18; Grey,
supra note 108, S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82.
113
Malinowski, supra note 108; Ross & Esposito, supra note 18; Grey,
supra note 108, S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82.
114
Grey, supra note 108; Malinowski, supra note 108.
115
Grey, supra note 108; S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 79–82.
116
Grey, supra note 108; S. Rep. No. 109-331, supra note 108, at 82; see
also Ross & Esposito, supra note 18 (“[I]t was later established that al Libbi
had no knowledge of such training or weapons and fabricated the statements
because he was terrified of further harsh treatment.”).
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E. The Extraordinary Rendition Program Damages the
Security of the United States
The extraordinary rendition program damages the national
security of the United States because it erodes the moral high
ground between the United States and terrorists 117 and because it
fuels anti-American sentiment around the globe.118 The United
States has traditionally been viewed as a role model for upholding
the values of democracy, civil liberties, and human rights. 119
However, when the United States violates its own principles by
secretly detaining and torturing prisoners, it erodes the moral
dichotomy between the United States and terrorists. 120
Significantly, extraordinary rendition tarnishes the image of the
United States in the minds of the Muslim mainstream,121 whom,
according to the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, the
United States should make “the most powerful weapon in the war
on terror.”122
117

Infra notes 120–121.
Infra note 123.
119
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 65;
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2; Malinowski,
supra note 108.
120
Malinowski, supra note 108; COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT,
supra note 10, at 65.
121
Malinowski, supra note 108; see also Extraordinary Rendition,
Extraterritorial Detention, and Treatment of Detainees: Restoring our Moral
Credibility and Strengthening our Diplomatic Standing, Hearing before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Dr. Daniel
Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Studies of the Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow,
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution) (“More
broadly, successful counterterrorism depends in part on convincing the world
that there is no moral equivalency between the terrorists and the government
they oppose. When the United States muddies these waters, this distinction
begins to blur. This is particularly problematic for U.S. attempts to woo fencesitters in the Muslim world—the very hearts and minds that the United States
most needs.”).
122
Press Release, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Declassified
Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate “ Trends in Global
Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” 2 (Apr. 2006), available at
118
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Similarly, the extraordinary rendition program fuels antiAmerican sentiment all over the world, especially in Europe:123
Undoubtedly and understandably, Europeans are not
pleased about their citizens or legal residents disappearing
off the streets of their cities or being shuttled against their
will and without due process to detention centers in
Afghanistan. One only needs to imagine how we would feel
about something parallel happening here in the United
States to understand the sense of outrage. What has surely
exacerbated this anger has been the sense that torture is the
inevitable concomitant to these movements. 124
The fight against terrorism is as much a moral and political struggle
as it is militaristic, and maintaining the moral high ground is critical
because winning the minds of the Muslim mainstream, and thus
dividing terrorists from the audiences they seek to persuade, is
essential to defeating terrorism.125 As the United States loses moral
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf
[hereinafter National Intelligence Estimate]. These Muslims will be a weapon
not in the literal sense, but by rejecting the use of violence by terrorists and
therefore undermining their community support and dividing terrorists from the
“audiences they seek to persuade.” Id.
123
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 65;
Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher Arar: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Daniel Benjamin, Director, Center on the United States and
Europe, The Brookings Institution and former director for counterterrorism on
the National Security Council staff under the Clinton Administration)
(Extraordinary rendition is at the “core of anger” among our European allies and
others, and allegations of torture have contributed to the “deep slide” of
America’s image in opinion polls around the world.).
124
Benjamin, supra note 123.
125
In the words of former Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak and
former CENTCOM Commander Joseph Hoar, “This war will be won or lost
not on the battlefield but in the minds of potential supporters who have not yet
thrown in their lot with the enemy.” Malinowski, supra note 108. General
David Petraeus recently told his troops in Iraq: “This fight depends on securing
the population, which must understand that we—not our enemies—occupy the
moral high ground.” Id. According to the April 2006 National Intelligence
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integrity in the minds of individuals around the globe, its national
security is damaged because this loss of integrity facilitates the
recruitment of new terrorists.126 According to the U.S. Army’s
Counterinsurgency Manual, since the United States cannot capture
or kill every terrorist, the United States must diminish the
terrorists’ “recuperative power”—their ability to recruit new
fighters—by increasing its legitimacy and decreasing the terrorists’
legitimacy.127
However, when the United States violates its own principles
with activities like extraordinary rendition that involve secret
detentions and torture, it loses the moral high ground as well as the
minds of the Muslim mainstream, helping to fuel terrorists’
“recuperative power.”128 Illegitimate actions by U.S. forces, such
as excessive use of force, unlawful detention, and torture “quickly
become known throughout the local populace and eventually
around the world,” and these actions “undermine both long-and
short-term [counterinsurgency] efforts.”129 Because it entails
contempt for the rule of law and massive violations of human
rights, extraordinary rendition
plays right into the hands of the criminals who seek to
Estimate, the United States needs to “divide [terrorists] from the audiences they
seek to persuade” and make the “Muslim mainstream . . . the most powerful
weapon in the war on terror.” National Intelligence Estimate, supra note 122, at
2.
More broadly, successful counterterrorism depends in part on
convincing the world that there is no moral equivalency between the
terrorists and the government they oppose. When the United States
muddies these waters, this distinction begins to blur. This is
particularly problematic for U.S. attempts to woo fence-sitters in the
Muslim world—the very hearts and minds that the United States most
needs.
Byman, supra note 121.
126
See supra, note 125.
127
Counterinsurgency, Field Manual No. 3–24, Marine Corps Warfighting
Publication No. 3-33.5, Dec. 2006, at 1–23, available at http://usacac.army.
mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf [hereinafter Counterinsurgency].
128
Id; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at
65.
129
Counterinsurgency, supra note 127, at 1–24.
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destroy our societies through terror. Moreover, in the
process we give these criminals a degree of legitimacy—that
of fighting an unfair system—and also generate sympathy
for their cause, which cannot but serve as an encouragement
to them and their supporters.130
As mentioned earlier, extraordinary rendition causes anti-American
sentiment,131 which, according to the April 2006 National
Intelligence Estimate, is one factor that “fuel[s] the spread of the
jihadist movement.”132 Compounding the problem is the fact that,
according to retired Major General Paul Eaton, the United States
“undoubtedly lost allies in the fight for Iraq . . . because of our
policies on extraordinary rendition, secret detention, and the use of
torture.”133
Thus, it is clear that “[t]he best and most effective way to
promote security is to preserve human rights and the rule of law.
Departure from long established, fundamental legal protections
only promotes lawlessness and ultimately makes everyone less
safe.”134
F. Extraordinary Rendition Diminishes Respect for Human
Rights Around the World
The United States is the “most influential country on the face
of the earth” and is a “standard setter in everything it does, for
better or for worse.”135 Additionally, the United States is supposed

130

COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 65;
Benjamin, supra note 123.
132
National Intelligence Estimate, supra note 122, at 2.
133
Eaton, supra note 102.
134
Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact
on Transatlantic Relations: J. Hearing before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Amnesty
International USA) [hereinafter Extraordinary Rendition in U.S.
Counterterrorism Policy] .
135
Malinowski, supra note 108; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006
REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
131
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to be the world’s leading protector of human rights. 136
Extraordinary rendition itself is a “hybrid” human rights violation,
as it encompasses multiple acts, including “elements of arbitrary
arrest, enforced disappearance, forcible transfer, torture, denial of
access to consular officials, and denial of impartial tribunals,” each
of which independently constitutes a rights violation.137
When the United States engages in and justifies practices like
extraordinary rendition, “all bets are off,” and “the entire
framework upon which we depend to protect human rights—from
the Geneva Conventions and treaties against torture—begins to fall
apart.”138
Because the whole idea of promoting democracy and human
rights is so associated with the United States, America’s fall
from grace has emboldened authoritarian governments to
challenge the idea as never before. As the United States
loses its moral leadership, the vacuum is filled by forces
profoundly hostile to the cause of human rights.139
G. Some Victims of Extraordinary Rendition Are Innocent and
Have No Ties to Terrorism
Some victims of extraordinary rendition have absolutely no ties
to terrorist activity. 140 The well-publicized cases of two such
136

Malinowski, supra note 108; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006
REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
137
David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV . HUM . RTS. J. 123, 127 (2006); see also
Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, supra note 134.
138
Malinowski, supra note 108; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006
REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
139
Malinowski, supra note 108. Mr. Malinowski cites an example of a
meeting between Human Rights Watch and the Prime Minister of Egypt
concerning the torture of hundreds of prisoners by Egyptian security forces. The
Prime Minister did not deny that the forces tortured prisoners; he simply stated
that “we’re just doing what the United States does.” Id.
140
Moreover, the secrecy surrounding extraordinary rendition, combined
with the lack of judicial oversight, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the exact number of victims of “erroneous rendition.” Even CIA
officials disagree over the number: one told The Washington Post that there were
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victims who have sued the United States, Khaled El-Masri141 and
Maher Arar,142 illustrate this problem. Khaled El-Masri, a German
citizen of Lebanese descent and father of five, was captured in
Macedonia on New Years Eve 2003 while attempting to cross the
border between Serbia and Macedonia.143 The Macedonian
authorities informed the CIA that they had detained El-Masri, and
the CIA extraordinarily rendered El-Masri to the “Salt Pit,” a CIA
prison in Afghanistan, because it thought his passport was forged
and because his name was similar to that of a September 11, 2001
hijacker associate.144 He was subjected to the “twenty minute
takeout”145 and then detained in a cold, filthy cell in a basement
with no light and a dirty blanket for four months.146
The first night, he was kicked and beaten and told that “[y]ou
are here in a country where no one knows about you, in a country
where there is no law. If you die, we will bury you and no one will
know.”147 All of his requests to meet with a German government
official were denied, and his conditions were so bad that he went on
a hunger strike for thirty-seven days until he was force-fed by
tubes inserted into his nose and mouth.148 He was finally released

about thirty-six such victims, but other officials believe the number is smaller.
Furthermore, there is no tribunal or judge to review the evidence against
individuals seized by the CIA: the CIA is responsible for policing itself. Priest,
Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
141
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
142
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
143
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE
JUNE 2006 REPORT , supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d
530, 532 (E.D.Va. 2006).
144
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE
JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
145
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE
JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533. For
a description of the “twenty minute takeout,” see supra notes 1–9.
146
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF EUROPE
JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
147
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
148
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 26; El-Masri,
437 F. Supp. 2d at 533–34.
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by being left on the side of an abandoned road in Albania.149
Fortunately, El-Masri has been re-united with his wife and
children, but his German and Arab friends shun him due to his
negative publicity. 150 Khaled El-Masri is an innocent man with no
ties to terrorist activity,151 and a Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe report noted twice that El-Masri’s descriptions
of his extraordinary rendition were credible.152
A second innocent victim of extraordinary rendition is Maher
Arar, a Canadian citizen who, in October 2002, was extraordinarily
rendered from JFK Airport in New York City to Syria, where he
was held in degrading conditions and tortured for almost a year.153
Arar was repeatedly beaten with an electrical cable on his hands
and upper body, and he was forced to hear the screams of other
detainees and subjected to other psychological stressors. 154 The
pain was so bad that “you forget the milk that you have been fed
from the breast of your mother.”155 On top of the physical
brutality, he was kept in a cell only six feet long, three feet wide,
and seven feet high that was damp and “very cold” in the winter
and “stifling” in the summer.156 Over time, the beatings decreased,
and the worst aspect of his detention became the “daily horror” of
living in his cell, which he described as a “grave” and “slow
death.”157
After a two-and-a-half year inquiry, a Canadian judicial report
concluded “categorically that there is no evidence” that Arar
committed any offense or is a security threat.158 The report is
149

El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2.
151
See, e.g., Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 2; COUNCIL OF
EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
152
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25, 31.
153
Doug Struck, Canadian Was Falsely Accused, Panel Says, W ASH.
POST , Sept. 19, 2006, at A01.
154
ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 55–56.
155
Mayer, supra note 38, at 106.
156
ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 56.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 59. According to the Arar Commission’s website, http://www.
ararcommission.ca/eng/index.htm, “The Inquiry was established February 5,
150
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unique as it is the first time that a commission in the Western
world investigating an allegation of extraordinary rendition had
access to all relevant government documents, allowing it to “[see]
the practice of extraordinary rendition in full color.”159 The report,
in large part, blamed Canadian officials for providing American
officials with faulty intelligence about Arar.160
H. The Bush Administration’s Legal Defense of Extraordinary
Rendition
In defense of extraordinary rendition, the Bush Administration
(“the Administration”) posits three main legal arguments.161 First,
it argues that human rights treaties, or particular provisions therein,
do not apply to extraterritorial transfers because these treaties only
apply to territory within U.S. jurisdiction.162 The Administration
2004 under Part I of the Inquiries Act, [R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11], on the
recommendation of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness to investigate and report on the actions of Canadian
officials in relation to Maher Arar.” “A public inquiry in Canada is a strong
instrument for investigation and accountability. It has full power to subpoena
relevant documents and enjoys de facto independence from the executive and
legislative branches of government.” Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher
Arar: Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm.
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Kent Roach, Professor of Law and
Prichard and Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy at the University of
Toronto) [hereinafter Rendition to Torture]. This inquiry conducted a
“thorough” investigation of the actions of Canadian officials, examined the
classified versions of thousands of documents, and heard in-camera testimony of
eighty-three witneses. Id.
159
Struck, supra note 153. This quote is from Paul Cavalluzzo, counsel for
the commission.
160
ARAR COMMISSION ANALYSIS, supra note 102, at 13–14.
161
For a detailed explanation and criticism of these arguments, see
Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1350–1418.
162
Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1350–51. For example, the American
Convention on Human Rights applies to “all persons subject to [a State
Party’s] jurisdiction.” Id. at 1352; American Convention on Human Rights art.
1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 171.
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has adopted a territorial rule of jurisdiction, arguing that jurisdiction
is limited to the geographical spaces inside the United States. 163
Second, the Administration argues that the liability of the United
States is barred when “host” nations that participate in
extraordinary rendition provide diplomatic assurances that they
will not torture detainees.164 However, these assurances lack any
degree of trustworthiness and systematically fail to prevent
torture.165 Finally, the Administration defends extraordinary
rendition as a type of wartime transfer in a new type of war that is
free from any limitations mandated by humanitarian law or human
rights treaties.166 This argument states that since the United States
is in an international armed conflict with a non-state enemy (al
Qaeda), humanitarian law and treaties like the Geneva Conventions
do not apply because these laws only govern armed conflicts
between nations or intrastate armed conflict. 167 However,
international legal scholars and advocates reject this approach.168
163

Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1351. Some scholars argue that instead
of defining jurisdiction in terms of geography, the better approach is to define
jurisdiction in terms of whether or not the United States has personal control
over an individual. Id. at 1369, 1375, 1379. This “personal control” approach
takes into account the object and purpose of human rights law and prevents the
United States from “carving out a space where no human rights law applies.”
See id. at 1378, 1351. For a more detailed explanation and criticism of this
argument, see id. at 1351–79.
164
Id. at 1379.
165
See infra Part III.A.6. For additional reasons why diplomatic assurances
should not shield the United States from liability, see Satterthwaite, supra note
27, at 1379–94.
166
Satterthwaite, supra note 27, at 1395.
167
Id. at 1399. For more explanation and criticism of this argument, see id.
at 1399–1418.
168
Id. at 1404–18. For example, some argue that while the laws of war are
not applicable to the “war on terror,” human rights law continues to apply. Id.
at 1404. Other scholars maintain that the conflict between the United States and
al Qaeda constitutes a non-international armed conflict to which the rules
applicable to such conflicts apply. Id. A third argument agrees with the
Administration’s argument that the United States is in a new type of war, but
posits that international humanitarian law must be read in conjunction with
other rules of international law to protect the basic rights of every human being.
Id.
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Additionally, other scholars defend the practice in similar
ways. 169 John Yoo, a professor at the University of California Law
School, who was formerly the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
in the Bush Administration,170 argues that the September 11
attacks were an act of war perpetrated by al Qaeda, and, as a result,
the United States is at war with al Qaeda.171 According to Yoo,
historical precedent demonstrates that the Constitution grants the
President exclusive control over individuals captured during
military operations.172 Furthermore, Yoo maintains that treaties
such as the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (“GPW”)173 and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“CAT”)174 do not apply to al Qaeda or the Taliban.175 Because al
Qaeda is not a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions,
and as members of the Taliban fail to meet certain standards
explained in Article 4 of the Convention, Professor Yoo argues that
the GPW and the CAT do not protect either group.176 For example,
these eligibility standards require that individuals wear uniforms,
openly bear arms, and follow the laws of war.177
Importantly, the above arguments in defense of extraordinary
rendition do not directly state that the practice is legal; rather, they
state that there is no law regulating the practice. Understandably,

169

See, e.g. A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular
Rendition, 37 SETON HALL L. R EV . 1 (2006).
170
Mayer, supra note 38, at 112.
171
John Yoo, Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a
New Legal Regime After September 11?: Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV . 1183, 1193–98 (2004).
172
Id. at 1204–23. Yoo gives examples from the Revolutionary War to the
Gulf War. Id.
173
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
174
Dec 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. N O . 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
175
Yoo, supra note 171, at 1223–32.
176
Id. at 1226–27.
177
Id. See also John Yoo, Commentary: Behind the ‘torture memos,’ Jan.
4, 2005, available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/01/05
_johnyoo.shtml (arguing that al Qaeda members do not follow the laws of war
because they hide among peaceful populations and attack civilians).
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these defensive arguments are heavily criticized and rebutted, 178
leaving open the possibility that if these arguments are indeed
meritless, and extraordinary rendition is in fact illegal, then victims
of the process still face great legal hurdles for recovery,
demonstrating the need for reform.179 On the other hand, if the legal
arguments in defense of extraordinary rendition do hold merit, and
the program in fact exists in a legal vacuum, Congress must act to
preserve the rule of law, due process, and separation of powers.
II. CURRENT O PTIONS AND T HEIR PROBLEMS
Though victims of extraordinary rendition currently have three
main causes of action, each legal claim has serious limitations. One
option is to bring a Bivens180 claim against the United States. A
second option is to bring suit under the Torture Victim Protection
Act,181 and a third option is to file suit pursuant to the Alien Tort
Statute,182 alleging violations of international legal norms or treaties
prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention and/or torture.
A. Bivens Claims
Under the first option, victims of extraordinary rendition can
bring a Bivens claim against the United States. Bivens establishes
that “the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent
have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court
despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right.”183 The
178

See, e.g., Satterthwaite, supra note 27; T ORTURE BY PROXY, supra note
28, at 30–100.
179
See infra Part II (explaining the problems extraordinary rendition
victims face in litigating their claims under existing law).
180
As developed in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
181
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (enacted March 12, 1992) (codified
as Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
182
28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Alien Tort Statute is also known as the Alien
Tort Claims Act.
183
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). In Bivens, FBI agents
entered Bivens’ apartment, searched it, and arrested him in front of his family for
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purpose of Bivens is to deter federal officers from violating
individuals’ constitutional rights, and Bivens suits can be brought
only against individual federal officers rather than federal
agencies.184 A Bivens suit cannot proceed if either the plaintiff
already has an identifiable, statutory cause of action or if “special
factors” warrant hesitation in creating a new cause of action when
Congress has declined to explicitly do so.185 In subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court has ruled that Bivens remedies are available for
some, but not all, constitutional violations.186
The Supreme Court, however, is hesitant about allowing Bivens
claims if the separation of powers or political questions doctrine is
involved.187 The separation of powers doctrine bars the judiciary
from adjudicating matters solely within the purview of the
executive or legislative branches, including the “conduct of foreign
relations,” which is constitutionally reserved to the Executive.188
Likewise, “[t]he political question doctrine excludes from judicial
review those controversies which revolve around policy choices
and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution

alleged narcotics violations. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Bivens brought suit,
claiming that the arrest and search were conducted without a warrant, that the
FBI employed unreasonable force in making the arrest, and that the arrest was
made without probable cause. Id. Bivens claimed damages for humiliation,
embarrassment, and mental suffering. Id. at 389–90. The Supreme Court
eventually heard the case and ruled that the complaint stated a valid cause of
action and that Bivens was entitled to money damages for any injuries he
suffered as a result of the FBI agents’ violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
397.
184
See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68–70 (2001).
185
Id. at 67.
186
When the Bivens remedy was created, it only applied to violations of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 66. Since then, the Court has extended Bivens to
cover some violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eight
Amendment, but not a First Amendment violation arising in the context of
federal employment. Id. at 67–68. For a more detailed explanation of the
Court’s Bivens jurisprudence, see id. at 65–74.
187
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
188
See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952).
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to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.”189
The idea underlying this doctrine is that “courts are fundamentally
underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards
for matters not legal in nature.”190
In Chappell v. Wallace,191 the Supreme Court “expressly
cautioned . . . that [a Bivens] remedy will not be available when
‘special factors counseling hesitation’ are present.”192 These factors
are not at all related to the merits of the case, rather, they involve
“the question of who should decide whether . . . a remedy should
be provided.”193 Pursuant to this rationale, courts will not extend a
Bivens remedy if the court believes the issue can be better decided
by other branches of government.194
Arar v. Ashcroft195 provides an example of the difficulties a
plaintiff may face in bringing a Bivens claim with respect to the
separation of powers and political question doctrines. The plaintiff
in Arar sued a number of United States officials, including former
Attorney General John Ashcroft and former Secretary of
Homeland Security Tom Ridge, and asserted two Bivens claims,
alleging he was a victim of extraordinary rendition.196
189

Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230

(1986).
190

Id.
462 U.S. 296 (1983).
192
Id. at 298 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
193
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983).
194
See id. at 378–80. Indeed, the Arar court rejected Arar’s Bivens claim
for that exact reason. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 286 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (“[G]iven the serious national-security and foreign policy issues at stake,
Bivens did not extend a remedy to Arar for his deportation to Syria and any
torture that occurred there.”).
195
414 F. Supp. 2d at 280–83.
196
Id. at 257–58, 266–67. Arar’s first Bivens claim was that defendants
violated his substantive due process rights, protected by the Fifth Amendment,
by “knowingly and intentionally subjecting him to torture and coercive
interrogation in Syria.” Id. at 257. Arar’s second Bivens claim was that his
substantive due process rights were violated by defendants when they subjected
him to arbitrary and indefinite detention without “access to counsel, the courts,
or his consulate.” Id. at 257–58, 266–67. Arar sought a declaratory judgment
and compensatory and punitive damages for both of these counts. Id. at 258.
191
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The Arar court dismissed Arar’s Bivens claims pursuant to the
separation of powers and political question doctrines.197 In refusing
to address the claims, the court noted that it must proceed
cautiously in reviewing claims that involve foreign policy and
relations with foreign governments, especially when such claims
raise policy issues that “are the prerogative of coordinate branches
of government.”198 Laying the groundwork for dismissal under the
separation of powers and political question doctrines, the Court
first wrote that the case did indeed raise national security and
foreign policy considerations implicating multi-national agreements
aimed at stopping terrorism, and that the propriety of these
considerations was better reserved to the Executive and Legislative
branches.199 Additionally, the Court felt that allowing Arar’s suit
to proceed would make foreign governments who covertly
cooperate with the United States think twice about future
cooperation, given the possibility of exposure in court. 200 The
Court further sidestepped review by quoting a Supreme Court case
noting the difficulties with assessing or dealing with alien claims:
Any policy towards aliens is vitally and intricately
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the
conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government. Such
matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference.201
Finally, the court rejected Arar’s Bivens claims by relying on
the “fundamental difference” between evaluating the actions of
domestic federal officials and those of international federal
197

See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 281.
199
Id.
200
Id. This suggests that the United States needs to rely on secret
agreements with other nations in order to “respond to situations involving our
national interest” and that Arar’s suit would basically force the U.S. government
to disclose information it told other nations it would keep secret, which would
cause “embarrassment of our government abroad.” Id. (citations omitted).
201
Id. at 282 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89
(1952)).
198
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officials.202 Evaluating federal officials’ actions in the United States
allows judges to balance individual rights vis-à-vis government
interests by using their “experience derived from living in a free and
democratic society.”203 The evaluation of foreign officials’ actions,
however, is different, as the government interests involved may be
drastically distinct from fundamental American values, leaving
judges with no knowledge or experience in evaluating such
actions.204 In short, the court determined that any judicial
declaration that extraordinary rendition was unconstitutional would
seriously impact foreign policy, a matter better left for other
branches of government that could better balance the interests
involved.205
In addition to arguing that the separation of powers and
political question doctrines bar adjudication of the case, the
government can also raise the state secrets defense in response to a
Bivens claim.206 This defense is a common law doctrine developed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds207 and
recognizes a privilege against revealing certain information that, if
made part of the public record in a civil or criminal proceeding,
would expose information detrimental to national security. 208 This
privilege belongs only to the government, must be asserted by the
202

Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 283.
206
See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007).
Khaled El-Masri, claiming to be a victim of extraordinary rendition, sued the
Director of the CIA and other unknown agents pursuant to, inter alia, Bivens,
alleging violations of his Fifth Amendment Due Process right. El-Masri v.
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534 (E.D.Va. 2006). The United States intervened
as a defendant and persuaded the court to dismiss El-Masri’s complaint on state
secrets grounds, and the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal. El-Masri v.
United States, 479 F.3d at 299–300. This privilege is a barrier to a Bivens
claim by any extraordinary rendition victim because the privilege arises out of
the extraordinary rendition program itself and the government’s contention that
the program needs to be kept secret. See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d at
538–39.
207
345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953).
208
See id. at 1, 7–8, 10.
203
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government, and “is not to be lightly invoked.”209 When formally
created and articled by the Reynolds court, the privilege was a
means of preventing discovery by the plaintiffs against the
government, 210 but has been extended by the Circuit Courts as a
ground for dismissing the entire case when the state secrets are “so
central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to
proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matter.”211
As previously mentioned, the case of Khaled El-Masri
illustrates how easily the government can use the state secrets
209

Id. at 7. The Reynolds Court imposed several requirements for successful
invocation of the privilege. The head of the department with control over the
issue, after personal consideration of the matter, must make a formal claim of
privilege. Id. at 7, 8. Next, “the court itself must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege,” and do so without
examining the evidence; even the judge cannot examine the evidence privately in
chambers. Id. at 8, 10. Considering all the circumstances of the case, if the court
concludes that there is a “reasonable danger” that production of the evidence
would expose matters that should not be disclosed due to national security
concerns, the privilege should prevent disclosure of those matters. Id. at 10.
Finally, even “the most compelling necessity” cannot overcome an approved
claim of privilege. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
In Reynolds, three civilian observers riding in an Air Force B-29 aircraft
died when the plane crashed, and their widows brought suits against the United
States. Id. at 3. In pretrial discovery motions, the plaintiffs asked for production
of the Air Force’s official accident investigation report as well as statements of
the three surviving crew members that were taken in connection with the
investigation. Id. at 4. The government’s argument, supported by an affidavit of
the Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force, was that the
requested report and statements would “seriously hamper national security” if
furnished. Id. at 5, 6. The District Court ordered the government to produce the
evidence so the court could decide if it in fact contained sensitive matters, but
the government did not obey the order. Id. at 5. Therefore, the court ordered that
the facts on the issue of negligence would be decided in plaintiff’s favor, and
final judgment was entered for the plaintiffs after a damages hearing. Id. The
government appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in full. United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 5 (1953). In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme
Court officially created the state secrets privilege. See id. at 6–10.
210
Id. at 3.
211
See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300, 306 (4th Cir.
2007) (dismissing El-Masri’s suit on state secrets grounds and collecting cases
where other Circuit Courts of Appeal dismissed cases on state secrets grounds).
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doctrine to dismiss lawsuits alleging extraordinary rendition.212 On
appeal, the plaintiff acknowledged that although some of the
information important to his claims may be protected by the state
secrets privilege, his case could be litigated without their
disclosure.213 Moreover, the plaintiff argued that the facts central
to his case are no longer secrets because they were made public by
statements of United States officials or in reports by media
organizations and foreign governments. 214 According to the
plaintiff, the fact that the CIA operates a rendition program
targeted at terrorism suspects and the tactics employed therein are
so widely discussed that litigation concerning them could not harm
national security. 215
Although the Fourth Circuit agreed that the general subject
matter of the litigation could be described without resort to state
secrets, the court stated that the controlling inquiry was whether
the action could be litigated without resort to state secrets. 216 In
order to establish a prima facie case, the Fourth Circuit maintained
that the plaintiff would have to produce evidence that the
defendants detained and interrogated him in a manner rendering
them personally liable.217 “Such a showing could be made only
with evidence that exposes how the CIA organizes, staffs, and
supervises its most sensitive intelligence operations,” and gathering
this evidence would require the plaintiff to rely on witnesses
whose identities, and even very existence, must remain secret in the
interest of national security. 218 Furthermore, even if the plaintiff
could create a prima facie case, the Court continued, the defendants

212

Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 303.
214
Id. at 308. That Khaled El-Masri was subject to extraordinary rendition
and the details of his experience have been extensively reported by the media and
government reports. See supra Part II.G (citations to media and government
reports detailing the extraordinary rendition of El-Masri.)
215
Id. Indeed, the abundance of reports cited within this Note shows that
the extraordinary rendition program has received extensive media coverage.
216
Id. at 309.
217
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007).
218
Id.
213
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could not defend themselves without using privileged evidence.219
The fourth problem facing any Bivens-based cause of action is
evidentiary: it is usually difficult, if not impossible, for victims of
extraordinary rendition to gather enough corroborative evidence to
bring a lawsuit. 220 Indeed, one of the reasons the CIA engages in
extraordinary rendition is because doing so means it will not have
to reveal sensitive information about its intelligence methods and
sources in American courts. 221 The whole process of extraordinary
rendition is secret; victims have been described as entering an
“invisible universe,”222 and detainees like Arar allege that they were
held incommunicado and denied access to a lawyer, courts, or their
consulate.223 Additionally, outside organizations that provide relief
to such detainees are often denied access to rendered individuals.224
For example, the United States has prevented the International
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) from meeting with some
overseas detainees, despite its request to meet with all of them, for
219

Id.
The main avenues of defense available in this matter are to show that
El-Masri was not subject to the treatment that he alleges; that, if he was
subject to such treatment, the defendants were not involved in it; or
that, if they were involved, the nature of their involvement does not
give rise to liability. Any of those three showings would require
disclosure of information regarding the means and methods by which
the CIA gathers intelligence.
Id.
220

See infra notes 221–25 and accompanying text discussing the secrecy
surrounding the extraordinary rendition program. Maher Arar and Khalid ElMasri are exceptions to this general problem because their cases have received
extensive media attention, and Arar’s case is the subject of a detailed
government investigation.
221
Mayer, supra note 38, at 109.
222
Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects, supra note 66.
223
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257–58, 266–67 (E.D.N.Y.
2006). Since detainees cannot see any humans other than their captors, there is
no neutral third party who can evaluate the detainees’ claims of torture and
collect evidence supporting or denying those claims. Id.
224
Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Rebuffs Red Cross Request for Access to
Detainees Held in Secret, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A10; Red Cross
Wants Access to Secret U.S. Jails, CHI . TRIB., Dec. 10, 2005, at 7; Priest &
Gellman, supra note 68.
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reasons of “national security.”225 All of these factors demonstrate
that many victims of extraordinary rendition who have not been the
subject of media attention or official investigations probably could
not bring any action against the United States because the very
nature of their detention prevented them from gathering any
evidence to corroborate their allegations.
B. Torture Victim Protection Act
A second cause of action for victims of extraordinary rendition
is to bring a claim under the Torture Victim Protection Act
(“TVPA”).226 Enacted in 1992, the TVPA reads:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an
individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to
extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful
death. 227
225

Supra note 224. Under international law, the ICRC has a special status
as the guardian of international humanitarian law. T ORTURE BY PROXY , supra
note 28, at 2 n.2. According to the ICRC website,
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial,
neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian
mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and
internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and
coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the
Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent
suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and
universal humanitarian principles.
International Committee of the Red Cross, The Mission, http://www.icrc.org/
HOME.NSF/060a34982cae624ec12566fe00326312/125ffe2d4c7f68acc1256ae300
394f6e?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 17, 2007). One of the Red Cross’
central purposes is to visit prisoners and protect their human rights. See
Weisman, supra note 224.
226
The TVPA is appended as a statutory note to the Alien Tort Claims
Act; it is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
227
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 260. Under the TVPA, torture is defined as
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Before one can bring a claim under the TVPA, however, all
“adequate and available” local remedies must be exhausted,228 and
the timing of the suit is particularly important because of a ten year
statute of limitations. 229 Although the text of the TVPA only
grants a cause of action against direct, primary violators, every
court that has considered the issue has held that the TVPA also
allows claims against secondary violators who aid and abet, or
conspire with, primary violators. 230
Despite such judicial interpretation, the TVPA is an ineffective
remedy for victims of extraordinary rendition as it requires that
defendant(s) act “under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation.”231 For example, even though the CIA
agents allegedly involved in Arar’s torture were “some of the
highest policy-making officials of this country,” those agents were
held by the court to have been acting under color of American, not
foreign law.232 Therefore, the TVPA would not protect Arar.233
Moreover, the court specifically rejected Arar’s argument that the
CIA agents should be deemed as acting under foreign law because

any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third
person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act
that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of
committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
Id.
228

In nations like Syria there is no adequate, alternative remedy for torture
victims. Id.
229
Id.
230
Id. at 261 (citing, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 779
(9th Cir. 1996); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); see also Cabello v. Fernandez Larios, 402 F.3d
1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005)).
231
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing
Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991)).
232
Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
233
Id. at 266.
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they conspired with foreign officials.234 In a similar case, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
Arar court’s reasoning and held that former national security
advisor Henry Kissinger, who was allegedly involved in a coup in
Chile that resulted in the defendant’s death, was acting pursuant to
a Presidential directive, and therefore acting under auspices of U.S.
law.235 These two rulings do not bode well for victims of
extraordinary rendition.
Like Bivens claims, suits under the TVPA are also easily
defeated by the state secrets privilege,236 the separations of powers
and political questions doctrines,237 or lack corroborative evidence
234

Id. Courts have held that sometimes, joint action between state and
federal officials can be considered conduct under state law for purposes of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Arar argues that his case, where federal officials acted with
foreign officials, is analogous and thus these US officials should be deemed as
acting under foreign law. Id. at 265–66. In rejecting this argument, the court
notes “it is perfectly reasonable to hold federal officials liable for constitutional
wrongs committed under color of state law because federal officials, when acting
under color of state law, are still acting under a legal regime established by our
constitution and our common jurisprudence in the domestic arena.” Id. at 266.
However, the issues federal officials face when acting in the foreign affairs realm
“may involve conduct and relationships of an entirely different order and policymaking on an entirely different plane . . . . U.S. officials deal with unique
dangers not seen in domestic life and negotiate with foreign officials and
individuals whose conduct is not controlled by the standards of our society.” Id.
235
Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d. 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2004),
aff’d 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding defendant was executing the direct
orders of the President, which constitutes action pursuant to US law, even
though defendant’s alleged foreign co-conspirators might have been acting
pursuant to foreign law).
236
In fact, the United States raised this defense in response to Maher Arar’s
TVPA claim. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257–58, 287 (E.D.N.Y.
2006). However, the court sidestepped the state secrets privilege and dismissed
Arar’s TVPA claim on other grounds. Id. at 266. Nonetheless, this defense
could be raised against any future claim against the United States by an
extraordinary rendition victim because the defense arises from the facts
underlying extraordinary rendition, not any particular cause of action. See ElMasri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535–39 (E.D. Va. 2006) (explaining how
the defense can be raised based on the alleged conduct of the executive branch
irrespective of a plaintiff’s particular cause of action).
237
Any theory of liability an extraordinary rendition victim may have
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supporting the plaintiff’s claims.238 These continuing problems,
coupled with courts’ refusal to view U.S. agents as acting under
foreign law, make application of the TVPA virtually impossible for
victims of extraordinary rendition.
C. ATS Claims
Victims of extraordinary rendition may alternatively file suit
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).239 Although the statute
grants district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States,”240 the statute does not create any
specific cause of action. Rather, the ATS merely grants federal
courts jurisdiction over civil suits brought by aliens for violations
of a limited set of well-recognized norms of international law.241
Regardless of which international law a plaintiff bases his theory of
liability upon, any action brought under the ATS will have four
potentially fatal flaws. First, the brief language of the ATS makes
clear that it applies only to aliens. 242 Therefore, U.S. citizens have
no remedy under this statute. Second, in defense of any ATS-based
claim, the government will likely raise a state secrets defense.243
against the United States may be defeated by separation of powers and/or
political question arguments because these doctrines arise from the alleged
conduct of the executive branch in carrying out the extraordinary rendition
program. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281–83 (explaining why courts should
not intervene in matters better reserved for the other branches of government).
238
Given the extreme secrecy surrounding the extraordinary rendition
program and the fact that these victims do not have counsel while detained, it
will likely be difficult for them to meet their preponderance of the evidence
burden. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
239
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
240
Id.; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699–700 (2004).
241
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. The Supreme Court did not identify exactly
which international legal norms are actionable under the ATS. Id. at 724–25.
242
See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only . . . .”).
243
The government did just that in El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d
530, 541 (E.D. Va 2006), aff’d El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied El-Masri v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 373, 2007 WL
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Futhermore, like cases involving Bivens and/or TVPA claims, any
ATS-based claim may be defeated by the separation of powers
and/or political question doctrines.244 Finally, like all other current
causes of action, any plaintiff bringing an ATS claim would face
tremendous evidentiary hurdles because the extraordinary rendition
program is completely shrouded in secrecy.245
III. A SOLUTION: A SPECIFIC CAUSE OF ACTION A GAINST THE
U NITED STATES FOR VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
T HAT EXPANDS THE SUPERVISION OF DETAINEES
Although there are several causes of action available for victims
of extraordinary rendition to bring suit against the United States, all
of these options fail in practice. To truly provide checks and

1646914, *1 (2007). In El-Masri v. Tenet, the defendant, claiming to be a
victim of extraordinary rendition, brought two ATS-based claims against the
United States, and the government successfully moved to dismiss based on the
state secrets privilege. Id. The gist of the government’s arguments in cases like
El-Masri is that litigating these cases would result in the exposure of details
about a clandestine intelligence program involving the United States and foreign
governments that would harm national security. See id. at 537. The government
could easily make this same argument in any future ATS-based suit brought by
an alleged victim of extraordinary rendition because, by its very nature, the
extraordinary rendition program involves state secrets. On a more general note,
the Bush Administration has asserted this privilege nineteen times as of early
June 2006, which is more frequent than any prior administration. Scott Shane,
Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a More Popular Legal Tactic by U.S., N.Y.
T IMES, June 4, 2006, at 32. This number is according to William G. Weaver, a
political scientist at the University of Texas at El Paso.
244
Maher Arar, a victim of extraordinary rendition who sued the United
States, lost his TVPA and Bivens claims on precisely these grounds. See Arar v.
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 281–83, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Although Arar
did not raise an ATS-based claim, the same logic the Arar court used against
TVPA and Bivens claims also works against ATS claims. This defense can be
asserted against any fact pattern involving extraordinary rendition, regardless of
plaintiff’s theory of liability, because this defense arises from the facts of the case,
not the particular cause of action. See id. at 281–83 (noting that the defense
arises from the executive branch’s alleged conduct, irrespective of plaintiff’s
cause of action).
245
See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text.
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balances, and to ensure that victims are not left without a remedy,
Congress must create a specific statutory cause of action against
the United States for the victims.
To be effective, such a cause of action must have eight
objectives. First, it will help prevent due process and separation of
powers violations by the Executive Branch. Second, it will allow
courts to adjudicate claims of extraordinary rendition without
running into political question and separation of powers problems.
Third, existing causes of action do not provide redress to all human
beings, and all people deserve protection against torture. Fourth,
the liability of U.S. officials who participate in extraordinary
rendition, directly or indirectly, needs to be clarified. Fifth, this
cause of action must prevent the government from escaping
liability by asserting the state secrets privilege. Sixth, the United
States cannot be able to avoid liability by obtaining diplomatic
assurances that the rendered individual will not be tortured because
such assurances lack an acceptable degree of credibility or sincerity.
Seventh, there needs to be an outside monitor of detainees that can
either corroborate claims of abuse or exonerate innocent
government officials because the secret nature of the extraordinary
rendition programs makes the gathering of evidence very difficult.
Finally, extraordinary rendition victims must be compensated to
redress their injuries and deter similar conduct in the future.
A. Objectives of the Law
1.

Preserving Due Process and Separation of Powers

The greatest advantage of this proposal is that it will help
protect due process rights of potential or actual victims of
extraordinary rendition, while preserving the balance of power
between the branches of the federal government. Due process
ensures that the government operates within the bounds of the law
and treats its constituents fairly and consistently. 246 Thus, due
246

See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (Observing that the
Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary
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process is an important check against tyranny because it prevents
arbitrary treatment of people and helps prevent the punishment of
innocent people. Like due process, ensuring the separation of
powers is a similar critical check against tyranny.247 The separation
of powers doctrine is “at the heart of our Constitution;” indeed,
one of the dominant themes underlying the founding of the United
States was the danger of governments digressing into tyranny and
the need to structure government to prevent such digression.248
2.

Addressing the Separation of Powers and Political Question
Issues

Another advantage of the above proposed law is that it will put
to rest any separation of powers or political question doctrine
problems that currently bar recovery for victims of extraordinary
rendition.249 The Arar court pointed out the necessity of explicit
Congressional action with regard to rendition lawsuits: “whether
the policy [involves] undermin[ing] or overthrow[ing] foreign
governments, or rendition, judges should not, in the absence of
explicit direction by Congress, hold officials who carry out such
policies liable for damages even if such conduct violates our treaty
obligations or customary international law.”250

exercise of the powers of government.”); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government.”).
247
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per curiam); United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) (Separation of powers was written into the
Constitution as a “bulwark against tyranny.”).
248
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 119–20 (explaining that James Madison in the
Federalist No. 47 wrote of the importance of separation of powers as a check
against tyranny).
249
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279–84, 287 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (dismissing Arar’s extraordinary rendition causes of action on political
question and separation of powers grounds).
250
Id. at 283 (emphasis added).
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3.

Providing Redress For All Victims

Unlike the Alien Tort Statute,251 any proposed legislative
solution that provides a cause of action must be available to all
human beings regardless of their citizenship or immigration status
because the impropriety of extraordinary rendition is neither
related to a person’s citizenship or immigration status nor should
relief be so conditioned.252 There is no logical reason why noncitizens should be excluded from bringing claims pursuant to the
proposed statute. Critics may argue that persons captured outside
of the United States should not have the same protections against
torture as those captured on U.S. soil.253 However, Congress
explicitly rejected arguments like this by enacting the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”):
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds
for believing the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States.254
The language of the FARRA demonstrates that Congress
intended to prohibit the extraordinary rendition of any person from
any location. Therefore, not only would the universal application
of the proposed law be consistent with Congressional intentions,
but such a statute would also promote good public policy by
251

See 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
699-700 (2004).
252
See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 3
(explaining that the fact that extraordinary rendition so far has only happened to
non-American citizens is shocking because it reflects a kind of “legal apartheid”
and an exaggerated sense of superiority).
253
The Supreme Court has sometimes held that Constitutional protections
do not apply to foreign nationals outside of the United States. For example, in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to property in a foreign country owned by a nonresident alien
that was searched and seized by U.S. agents. 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
254
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105277, div. G, Title XXII, § 2242 (emphasis added).
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extending a cause of action to all human beings. Extraordinarily
rendering aliens captured abroad is as severe a violation of due
process and other civil liberties as rendering Americans captured
within the United States,255 and accordingly, both groups of people
should have the same remedy. Moreover, extraordinary rendition is
not despicable because of the victims’ citizenship or location, but
rather because it offends human dignity and human rights that
apply to all people by virtue of their humanity. 256
Finally, this law will allow all human beingseven convicted
terroriststo sue the United States. While the idea of a terrorist
suing the United States may be hard for some to stomach, due
process protects convicted criminals,257 and this law gives effect to
that protection. Moreover, the “any person” language258 in
FARRA demonstrates Congressional intent that not even the worst
of terrorists should be subject to extraordinary rendition.
Additionally, as mentioned in the previous paragraph,
extraordinary rendition is wrong because it is dehumanizing, and
becoming a terrorist does not strip a person of his humanity.
4.

Liability of U.S. Officials: Taking of Responsibility

American case law supports the notion that liability attaches to
U.S. officials who indirectly torture detainees or aid and abet the
primary torturers by transferring a detainee to a nation known to
torture prisoners. 259 Further, organizations like Human Rights
255

Indeed, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment says no
“person,” as opposed to no citizen, shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall any person. . .
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”) (emphasis
added).
256
See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 21
(Rendition is a “degrading and dehumanizing practice” that inflicts “grave and
long-lasting psychological damage” upon its victims.).
257
United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1986).
258
“[I]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person . . . .” Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, Title
XXII, § 2242 (emphasis added).
259
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
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Watch persuasively argue that “rendition to torture is the legal and
moral equivalent of engaging in torture directly.”260 If the law only
creates liability for those officials who directly torture detainees, it
would not accomplish the policy goal of reducing torture and
abuse, as U.S. officials could easily transfer the detainee to foreign
officials who could torture the detainee. In fact, that is often how
extraordinary rendition works.261 Therefore, as a practical matter,
any law that does not include liability for those who aid or abet
will have little effect in reducing torture or compensating the
victims.
5.

State Secrets Privilege: Balancing Secrets and Accountability

Any solution to the problem of extraordinary rendition must
also address the state secrets privilege.262 The government has an
interest in keeping sensitive foreign affairs and intelligence gathering
programs out of the public eye.263 At the same time, victims of
extraordinary rendition have an interest in being compensated for
their wrongful capture and torture and in deterring future

(citing, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 799 (9th Cir. 1996);
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 WL 319887, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); see also Cabello v. Fernandez Larios, 402 F.3d
1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that every court considering the TVPA has
concluded that it applies to indirect violators who aid and abet or conspire with
the primary torturers).
260
Wendy Patten, US Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch,
Statement on U.S. Rendition Legislation (Mar. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/10/usint10294.htm.
261
Priest & Gellman, supra note 68 (explaining that U.S. officials often
send detainees to other countries so the other nations can torture them).
262
See supra notes 212 and 236 (explaining that in the two instances where
a person has sued the United States for being subject to extraordinary rendition,
the government has raised the state secrets defense). These cases show the
government’s willingness to raise the privilege as a defense to extraordinary
rendition suits.
263
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing El-Masri’s extraordinary rendition lawsuit because the government
has an interest in not revealing state secrets and litigating the matter would
reveal those secrets).
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extraordinary renditions.264 The above proposed law will balance
the competing interests of the parties by protecting sensitive
information while providing for judicial oversight and
compensation for victims.
Allowing the government to escape liability by asserting the
state secrets privilege effectively subverts the rule of law,265 which
is especially problematic given that the consequence is torture.
Moreover, as is clear from the government’s constant invocation of
the state secrets doctrine,266 the Administration is overusing and
abusing the privilege267 despite warnings from the Supreme Court
that the privilege “is not to be lightly invoked.”268
Regarding extraordinary rendition specifically, “[t]he experience
of the [Arar Commission] suggests that governments may be
264

See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va 2006)
(recognizing that Khaled El-Masri has private interests in bringing his lawsuit);
see generally Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l., Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1238 (4th
Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen the state secrets privilege is validly asserted, the result is
unfairness to individual litigants.”).
265
See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, 59
(explaining that invoking state secrets years after the event in question occurred,
like the US government did in the El-Masri litigation, “is unacceptable in a
democratic state based on the rule of law” and that “state secrecy cannot in any
circumstances justify or conceal criminal acts and serious human rights
violations.”).
266
Scott Shane, Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a More Popular Legal
Tactic by U.S., N.Y. T IMES, June 4, 2006, at 32.
267
See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and
Executive Power, 120 POL . SCI. Q. 85, 85–112 (Spring 2005). In reviewing
many cases where the executive branch asserts the state secrets privilege, the
authors state that “the state secrets privilege, a judicial creation, is now
judicially mishandled to the detriment of our constitutional system.” Id. at 86.
They also write that, “the privilege, as now employed, is tantamount to courts
capitulating in their oversight function.” Id. at 90. The authors also discuss
several cases in which the government invoked the privilege that resulted in
injustice of a “sharp and disturbing nature,” such as Frost v. Perry, 919 F.
Supp. 1459 (D. Nev. 1996) and Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
1998). Id. at 103–04. Finally, the authors write that “conflict of interest is a
fundamental problem afflicting the current arrangement for assertion of the
privilege and the deference with which courts are required to treat such
assertions.” Id. at 107.
268
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).

J OHNSTON F INAL DRAFT A UTHOR IZED . DOC

406

12/18/07 4:40 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

tempted to make overbroad claims of secrecy to protect themselves
from embarrassment and to hinder accountability processes. It also
suggests, however, that much information about even
contemporary national security activities can be made public
without harming national security.”269 Generally speaking, the
government has a tendency to overclassify information, especially
when facing lawsuits by whistle-blowers or people with grievances
against the government.270 For example, in a 2004 Congressional
hearing, Carol Haave, the deputy undersecretary for
counterintelligence at the time, admitted that “I do believe we
overclassify information” and estimated that information is
overclassified about half the time.271 Similarly, Thomas Kean, the
chairman of the 9/11 committee, stated that in his opinion three
quarters of the classified information he reviewed as chairman
should not have been classified.272
This trend in overclassification is not new, however. Erwin
Griswold, the former U.S. Solicitor General who argued the
Pentagon Papers Case,273 wrote an Op-Ed piece in The Washington
Post stating there was not “any trace of a threat” to national
security from the publication of the Pentagon Papers, despite the
fact that the government classified the papers under national
security concerns.274 Mr. Griswold continued: “It quickly becomes
apparent to any person who has considerable experience with
classified material that there is massive overclassification and that
the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security,

269

Rendition to Torture, supra note 158. For more on the Arar
Commission, see supra note 158.
270
See infra notes 271–78 and accompanying text.
271
Too Many Secrets: Overclassification As a Barrier to Critical
Information Sharing: Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations, 108th Cong. 82 (2004)
(statement of Carol Haave, deputy undersecretary for counterintelligence),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2004/082404transcript.html.
272
Tom Blanton, Editorial, Eyes Only; The Lie Behind the Secrets, L.A.
T IMES, May 21, 2006, at M1.
273
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
274
Erwin Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and
Classified Information, W ASH. P OST , Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
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but with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another.”275
Similarly, Tom Blanton, the director of the National Security
Archive at George Washington University, recently argued in a Los
Angeles Times editorial that the great irony about the state secrets
privilege is that the case in which it was developed, Reynolds v.
United States,276 was based on government dishonesty. 277
Specifically, he notes that the documents the government tried to
keep secret in Reynolds did not contain actual state secrets; rather,
the government classified them to cover up its own negligence.278
The problem of overclassification, together with an imbalance
between the rights of the government and the rights of the
individual, has ensured that victims of extraordinary rendition do
not have any effective remedies for their injuries. However,
individual rights should not be subverted in the context of fighting
terrorism.279 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,280 eight Justices of the
Supreme Court held that a U.S. citizen, captured in a foreign
combat zone and being detained as an enemy combatant, was
entitled to, at a minimum, “a meaningful opportunity to contest the
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker:”281
[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President when
it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. Whatever
power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual
liberties are at stake.282
This individual right, not only of habeas corpus, but of the right to
have the actions of the government reviewed in how it treats

275

Id.
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
277
Blanton, supra note 272.
278
Id.
279
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’ Connor, J.,
plurality).
280
542 U.S. 507.
281
Id. at 509–10, 541, 573.
282
Id. at 536 (O’ Connor, J., plurality) (internal citations omitted).
276
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individuals, must be protected and strengthened, as the above law
aims to do.
Certainly, critics of the above proposal regarding the state
secrets privilege may argue that the proposal will require the
government to defend itself, even when claims are meritless, by
disclosing sensitive information.283 This would effectively force an
innocent party—the government—to pay for something that it did
not do. As valid as this concern may be, however, the absence of
such a requirement would permit a guilty governmental party to
avoid liability for an entire set of offenses simply by asserting the
privilege.284 Moreover, the proposed law provides a mechanism to
deal with such concerns: the requirement that detainees be
monitored by the ICRC will allow an innocent government to cite
the testimony of Red Cross officials that the detainee was not
tortured without having to reveal sensitive information. 285
6.

Diplomatic Assurances

Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has stated that is
not U.S. policy to render detainees “to countries where we believe
or we know that they’re going to be tortured” and that if a country
has a history of torture, the United States will seek additional
assurances that the rendered detainee will not be tortured.286 The
United States claims that these assurances are not treated lightly. 287
The Washington Post reports that the CIA’s general counsel office
requires that “the station chief in a given country [] obtain a verbal
assurance from that country’s security service [that torture will not
occur]. The assurance must be cabled back to CIA headquarters
283

See supra note 219 (explaining how an innocent government facing an
extraordinary rendition lawsuit would have to disclose state secrets to defend
itself).
284
See COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 58
(Khaled El-Masri is unable to hold anyone accountable for his extraordinary
rendition because of the state secrets privilege.).
285
For more on this requirement, see infra Part III.B.7.
286
Smith, supra note 79.
287
Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send
Suspects Abroad, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1.
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before a rendition takes place.”288 An anonymous U.S. official has
stated that “we get assurances, we check on those assurances, and
we double-check on these assurances to make sure that people are
being handled properly in respect to human rights,” and that
compliance is ‘‘very high.’’289 Nonetheless, ‘‘nothing is 100
percent unless we’re sitting there staring at [the rendered detainees]
24 hours a day.’’290
This process, therefore, only illustrates that government
officials should not be allowed to defend themselves with
diplomatic assurances that the detainee will not be tortured in the
host nation because “the odds of torture after a rendition are much
higher than fifty percent and diplomatic assurances [in this context]
are legally worthless.”291 Even U.S. intelligence agents involved in
renditions claim that the CIA recognizes the flimsy nature of
diplomatic assurances.292 Vincent Cannistraro, the former head of
the CIA’s counterterrorism division, has stated in regards to Maher
Arar’s case that “you would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to
believe that the Syrians were not going to use torture, even if they

288

Dana Priest, CIA’s Assurances On Transferred Suspects Doubted;
Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture Pledges, W ASH. POST, Mar. 17,
2005, at A01 [hereinafter Priest, CIA Assurances Doubted].
289
Jehl & Johnston, supra note 287.
290
Id.
291
Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic
Assurances and the Legality of “Rendition,” 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 213, 263–
64 (2006). Ms. Hawkins examined twenty cases of rendition, seventeen of which
involved allegations of torture. If the prisoners in the other three cases were
tortured, they have no way of making their allegations known because they have
not been released or heard from after being rendered. In two of the seventeen
cases, the allegations of torture were vague and from a source of suspect
credibility, but the detainees were in Egypt, a nation with a long history of
torture. In two other cases, the torture allegations are vague, but they come from
U.S. officials who “have no reason to fabricate them.” In the remaining thirteen
cases, the torture allegations were detailed, corroborated by other evidence, and
consistent with reports from other detainees and human rights groups describing
the process. Ms. Hawkins’ argument is that diplomatic assurances are worthless
because in at least seventeen of these twenty cases, there is reason to believe the
detainee was tortured anyway. Id.
292
Id. at 261.
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were making claims to the contrary.”293 Arar’s case is probably the
best documented example of the failure of diplomatic assurances to
prevent torture. Current and former intelligence officers and
lawyers have told the media that this system of relying on
diplomatic assurances is “ineffective” and “virtually impossible to
monitor.”294 Another U.S. official who has visited foreign detention
sites stated that the issue “goes far beyond” the assurance: “They
say they are not abusing them, and that satisfies the legal
requirement, but we all know they do.”295 The picture that emerges
from these media accounts is that diplomatic assurances are made
and accepted in bad faith and do not serve to prevent or reduce
torture of extraordinary rendition victims.
7.

ICRC Monitoring of Detainees

Ensuring that the ICRC monitors all detainees will be
advantageous to all sides. Detainees will benefit because the ICRC
will monitor their condition and get them any necessary help.
Moreover, if the detainee’s allegations regarding extraordinary
rendition are true, the ICRC may provide corroborating evidence in
court. The government will also benefit from the presence of the
ICRC because if the plaintiffs allegations are false, then ICRC
evidence will bolster its defense.
If, however, the ICRC is not allowed to monitor all detainees,
the detainee’s allegations will be presumed true in order to prevent
abuse and bad faith actions. This is necessary because otherwise,
the ICRC will not be able to corroborate the detainee’s story, nor
rebut the story with other evidence and act as a defense for the
government. This aspect of the proposal will ensure that both sides
are balanced and dependent on the presence of the ICRC for
evidentiary purposes. For example, if the United States sends a
detainee to a nation that it knows will not admit the ICRC, it is
creating an inherently unfair situation for the detainee, because the

293

Shannon McCaffrey, Canadian Sent to Syrian Prison Disputes U.S.
Claims Against Torture, K NIGHT-RIDDER, Aug. 1, 2004.
294
Priest, CIA Assurances Doubted, supra note 288.
295
Id.
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very circumstances of his detention make it difficult to prove his
allegations in court. Moreover, the Executive Branch is in the best
position to ensure that the ICRC has access to detainees,296 and if
it cannot do so, it must shoulder the burden.
8.

Making Things Right: Awarding Plaintiffs Damages

Victims of extraordinary rendition are tortured both mentally
and physically. 297 On the most basic level, the uncertainty arising
from being detained secretly, without anyone other than the
detainee’s captors knowing about his whereabouts or well-being,
and without any judicial or ICRC control, is a form of torture.298
Extraordinary rendition is a degrading and dehumanizing process
that inflicts “grave and long-lasting” psychological damage on its
victims.299 What’s worse, these “deep psychological scars” persist
long after the detainee is located or released.300 Victims have a
“permanent fear of death,” are unable to have normal relationships,
and suffer from flashbacks and panic attacks.301 Additionally, “on a
daily basis, stigma and suspicion seem to haunt anybody branded
as ‘suspect’ in the ‘war on terror,’” making links with normal
society “practically impossible to restore.”302 It is undeniable,
therefore, that all plaintiffs should be able to recover damages for
extraordinary rendition.
To begin, victims should be able to receive punitive damages if
they demonstrate a valid case of extraordinary rendition. At a basic
level, courts award punitive damages to punish defendants for
malicious or willful conduct and to deter others from similar
296

The executive is in the best position because it is the detainer.
Infra notes 298–302 and accompanying text.
298
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 25, and
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2007 REPORT, supra note 10, at 51 (Louise Arbour,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has said that
detention without judicial or ICRC review in an unknown location is a form of
torture.).
299
COUNCIL OF EUROPE JUNE 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
300
Id. at 23.
301
Id.
302
Id.
297
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conduct. 303 Sometimes, decent law-abiding people are careless and
injure another; society however reacts more strongly to the
deliberate wrongdoer, and punitive damages are one way of
expressing the high level of condemnation of certain morally
reprehensible acts. 304 Torturing a person, or rendering him to a
nation when the renderer has substantial grounds to believe the
victim will be tortured, is certainly malicious, willful conduct that
must be deterred. Furthermore, punitive damages are “especially
appropriate” when the government violates individuals’
Constitutional rights.305
Moreover, compensatory damages do not always compensate
the plaintiff fully, especially when the injury is real but difficult to
quantify. 306 Understandably, torture and deprivation of liberty are
very difficult to quantify, so there is the risk that compensatory
damages will be inadequate. Since torture does more harm than
good to society, 307 punitive damages will ensure that extraordinary
rendition victims are adequately compensated without risking the
suppression of a socially valuable activity. 308 If compensatory
damages cannot compensate for the actual harm done, and if
punitive damages are not awarded, then the behavior will not be
deterred.309 Punitive damages will “assure full compensation
without impeding socially valuable conduct,” even if they provide
what some may consider excessive damage awards, because the

303

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986).
Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996).
305
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 22. As this Note argues, extraordinary
rendition violates a number of Constitutional provisions, most notably the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
306
Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 34.
307
That torture does more harm than good to society is implicit in the
various international treaties and agreements banning torture, such as the United
Nations Convention Against Torture (Dec 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO . 10020, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85), federal laws banning torture, such as the Torture Act of
2000 (18 U.S.C. §§2340 and 2340A), and policy statements such as FARRA
(see supra note 254 and accompanying text).
308
Kemezy, 79 F.3d at 34.
309
Id.
304
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deterrent value will be so high.310
Additionally, punitive damages are necessary when the
tortuous conduct is concealable, because a judgment equal to the
value of the harm done will under-deter, as not all actions will be
discovered.311 It is difficult to conceive of a tort more concealable
than extraordinary rendition: the government will not even
officially admit to the practice312 and victims of extraordinary
rendition are said to enter an “invisible universe.”313 Indeed, in both
instances where an alleged victim of extraordinary rendition has
sued the United States, the government has tried to conceal aspects
of the case by invoking the state secrets privilege.314

310

Id.
Id. at 34–35.
Suppose a person who goes around assaulting other people is caught
only half the time. Then in comparing the costs, in the form of
anticipated damages, of the assaults with the benefits to him, he will
discount the costs (but not the benefits, because they are realized in
every assault) by 50 percent, and so in deciding whether to commit the
next assault he will not be confronted by the full social cost of his
activity.
Id. at 35.
However, if punitive damages are imposed:
[k]nowing that he will have to pay compensation for harm inflicted, the
potential injurer will be deterred from inflicting that harm unless the
benefits to him are greater. If we do not want him to balance costs and
benefits in this fashion, we can add a dollop of punitive damages to
make the costs greater.
Id. at 34.
312
President Bush has admitted that “a small number of suspected terrorist
leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned
outside the United States” in a program operated by the CIA that employs “an
alternative set of procedures” that are tough. Remarks on the War on Terror,
supra note 88, at 1570-71. However, President Bush denies that the procedures
employed in this program are illegal and that maintains that “the United States
does not torture.” Id. at 1571, 1573.
313
Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects, supra note 66.
314
El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2007); Arar
v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
311
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B. Specific Elements of this Cause of Action

The specific elements of this proposed cause of action may be
grouped according to the definition of extraordinary rendition and
limits on who can be a potential plaintiff or defendant; the
procedural element of the permissible claim; the checks and
balances required; and the damages that may be awarded. First,
extraordinary rendition will be defined the same way it is in this
Note: “the transfer of an individual, with the involvement of the
United States or its agents, to a foreign state when there are
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.”315 Second, the remedy will extend to
any human being, regardless of his citizenship status or the location
where he was allegedly seized and/or tortured. A third element will
be that the plaintiffs will be allowed to sue any individuals who
were either directly or indirectly liable for the extraordinary
rendition and torture, including those who aid and abet or conspire
with the primary actors
As for the procedural element, fourth, this cause of action
should provide that if the government raises a state secrets defense
to any or all the elements, then the court will automatically grant
judgment for the plaintiff(s) on those element(s) but will not force
the government to reveal the secrets.
In regard to the checks and balances in place, a fifth requirement
will be a mandate that the United States must allow members of the
ICRC to visit and monitor every detainee without exception.316
This provision will require the Executive Branch to enforce its
provisions as best as possible and will explicitly state that if a
prisoner can show that he or she was not monitored by the ICRC
(such as through testimony of ICRC personnel), everything the
victim alleges that could have been corroborated by the ICRC will
be presumed true.
Additional checks and balances will also require that the

315

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
This section will apply to any human being, in any location, who is in
the custody of U.S. agents, except for prisoners in federal custody who are in
some stage of the regular criminal justice system.
316
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plaintiff(s) must show that the defendants had or should have had
substantial grounds to believe that the “host” nation would torture
the plaintiff.317 A reliance on diplomatic assurances from foreign
officials by U.S. officials that the “host” nation will not torture will
be explicitly rejected as a defense, requiring more active
responsibility on the part of the United States in monitoring the
host nation.
Finally, the seventh requirement relates to compensation, and
will provide damages to eligible plaintiffs for pain and suffering,
loss of liberty, emotional distress, damage to reputation, as well as
punitive damages. As a practical matter, these seven requirements
are essential to this cause of action, and they will advance the goals
listed above.
CONCLUSION
Extraordinary rendition violates the due process rights of its
victims and is a blatant example of unchecked executive power.
This Note calls on Congress to create a cause of action for victims
of extraordinary rendition that solves both of these problems. In
doing so, this Note proposes a number of legal changes concerning
who may be protected, how evidence will be ensured, and the
damages that plaintiffs will be able to collect, in an effort to help
resolve such a sensitive and controversial practice. The proposed
law will balance both governmental and individual interests, but
provide victims with a presumption of torture if other factors are
present, prodding the Executive Branch into complying with the
law. Similarly, the proposed law will mandate independent
monitoring of detainees, producing evidence from a neutral source
that may be used by either side at trial. In the end, we must not
forget that an important purpose of government is to protect
individuals from all threats, including those threats from the
government itself. The best way to fulfill this purpose is to have all
317

Plaintiffs could make this showing with reports by the State Department
or another agency of the U.S. government, United Nations reports, reports by
foreign governments, media reports, reports of human rights organizations,
decisions by international or domestic courts, academic articles, or other
evidence.
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three branches of the government work together to ensure the
security of the United States and the rights of all people.

